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BARBARIANS AT THE BAR: REGULATION OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION THROUGH THE
ADMISSIONS PROCESS
CarolM Langford*
Characteris like a tree and reputation is like its shadow. The shadow
is what we think of it; the tree is the real thing.

-Abraham
I.

Lincoln

INTRODUCTION: THE "EXAM" YOU CAN'T PREPARE FOR

Gaining admission to the Bar is not easy. An undergraduate
education, the LSAT, three intensive years at a law school, and the
infamously difficult Bar exam (especially in my state, California)
presumably screen out a fair share of potential attorneys from even
pursuing a career in the legal field. Although difficult, these hurdles are
comprehensible, with clear objectives. The applicant is fully aware of
the expectations and requirements. Ultimately, the applicant's success is
contingent on hard work and preparation.
In addition to the Bar exam and the prerequisites necessary to take
the Bar exam, there is a less well-known requirement Bar applicants
must satisfy for entry to the Bar: the moral character requirement. The
moral character requirement demands that each applicant seeking
admission to the Bar bear the "burden of demonstrating to the
appropriate body in charge that he or she possesses the character needed
to successfully and ethically practice law."1 For those applicants
potentially facing delayed admission or outright denial based on a failure
to meet the character requirement, this task is easier said than done.
*

Carol M. Langford is an Adjunct Professor of Law at U.C. Hastings College of Law. She

is a past Chair of the California Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct and has a
full-time practice in the attorney conduct area of law. This Article could not have been written
without the support and assistance of Tom Sansani, law office clerk extraordinaire.
1. Marcus Ratcliff, Note, The Good CharacterRequirement: A Proposalfor a Uniform
National Standard,36 TULSA L.J. 487, 488 (2000).
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No uniform definition of "moral character" exists despite the
inclusion of the character requirement in every state's Bar admission
process. 23 Because entering the mind of applicants is impossible,3 the
determination of a person's moral character ultimately depends on the
applicant's prior actions.4 The subjectivity inherent in predicting future
wrongdoing based on prior actions poses a formidable obstacle not only
for the applicants with a regrettable past, but for the examiners with the
responsibility of determining an applicant's admissions fate.5 The United
States Supreme Court, in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners6 and
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, two definitive character
examination cases in the mid-20th century, openly admit the fluidity of
the character requirement calling it "unusually ambiguous"' 7 with
"shadowy rather than precise bounds." 8 The American Bar Association
("ABA") seconds this sentiment, admitting in the Bar Examiner's
Handbook that "[n]o definition of what constitutes grounds for denial of
admission on the basis of faulty character exists." 9
Despite its subjectivity, the moral character requirement exists as a
precautionary measure aimed at protecting consumers from substandard
practitioners l° as well as preserving the professionalism of the law."1
This is especially necessary now more than ever as the general
population perceives lawyers as one of the most untrustworthy and
corrupt group of professionals.' 2 Not to mention that, in a post-Enron
world, regulation and a focus on integrity is more popular now than ever
2. Arpa B. Stepanian, Note, Law Student Clerkships; Walking a Thin Line Requirement of
"Good Moral Character"forAdmission to the Bar, 3 J. LEGAL ADVOC. & PRAC. 67, 68-69 (2001);

see Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252, 262-63 (1957).
3.

Aaron

M. Clemens,

Facing the Klieg Lights: Understanding the

"Good Moral

Character"Examinationfor Bar Applicants, 40 AKRON L. REV. 255, 256 (2007) (citing In re Maria
C. for Admission to the Bar of Md., 451 A.2d 655, 656 (1982) (Smith, J., dissenting)).
4. See In re Maria C, 451 A.2d at 656 (Smith, J., dissenting).
5. See Richard R. Arnold, Jr., Comment, Presumptive Disqualificationand Prior Unlawful
Conduct: The Danger of Unpredictable CharacterStandardsfor Bar Applicants, 1997 UTAH L.
REV. 63, 73.

6. Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
7.

Konigsberg,353 U.S. at 263.

8. Schware, 353 U.S. at 249 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
9. See THE BAR EXAMINERS' HANDBOOK 123 (Stuart Duhl ed., 2d ed. 1980).
10. See S. DAVID YOUNG, THE RULE OF EXPERTS: OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING IN AMERICA

15 (1987) (noting that a system of occupational licensing, such as admittance to the Bar, protects the
public from "incompetents, charlatans, and quacks").
11.
12.

See id. at 5-6.
See Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers in Public Opinion,

Jokes, and Political Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 805, 809 (1998) ("When, in 1991, a national
sample was asked to volunteer 'what profession or type of worker do you trust the least,' lawyers
were far and away the most frequent response.").
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in the distribution of occupational licenses. 13 Although the proportion of
applicants denied admission to the Bar is minute, estimated at one in
five-hundred, 14 the requirement persists in every state and commands a
fairly large amount of time and money 15 because of its necessity in
protecting the public and protecting the system ofjustice.
The underlying rationale behind the moral character requirement
proves its necessity in Bar admissions. But this rationale must be
reconciled with the problematic issues facing the system today. While
the ABA has done much in uniformity of objectives and practices,
setting forth relevant conduct that may "be treated as cause for further
inquiry before the Bar examining authority," 16 there are several
additional improvements which could be implemented both before and
after the character and fitness examination that would benefit both the
client and the lawyer. The ABA has led the way before in streamlining
and justifying the standard of character and fitness and there is no need
to stop now.
Part II of this Article traces the history of Bar admissions, the oldest
form of regulation of the legal profession, particularly the evolution of
the moral character standard. The shifting perceptions of moral character
through history shed light on evolving prejudices, as evidenced by the
exclusion of specific groups at certain times in America's relatively
short history.
The third Part of this Article evidences how far the moral character
analysis has come, specifically addressing the rationale behind the moral
character requirement as well as its necessity as a form of lawyer
regulation and protection of the public as seen in the infamous case of
Matthew Hale.17
Part IV of this Article explores several problems arising out of the
indeterminacy of moral character as well as the insular composition of
the character committee. The character committee's subjective reliance
on predictive techniques as well as the possible emergence of
institutionalized discrimination against certain ostracized groups in
society highlight the difficulties inherent in preemptive self-regulation.
13. See Deborah L. Rhode, If Integrity is the Answer, What is the Question?, 72 FORDHAM L.
REV. 333, 333 (2003).
14. See Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Characteras a ProfessionalCredential,94 YALE L.J. 491,
516 (1985) (discussing estimates for forty-one states in 1982).
15. See id. at 512-15.
16.

CODE OF RECOMMENDED STANDARDS FOR BAR EXAMINERS 111.13 (1987), available at

http://www.abanet.org/legaled/publications/compguide2005/codeofstandards.pdf.
17. In re Hale, Comm. on Character and Fitness (I11.
App. 3d 1998), as reprinted in
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET. AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 876 (3d ed. 1999).
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The fifth Part of the Article discusses how the moral character
requirement has actually benefited oppressed groups. Although in the
past the arbitrariness of the moral character requirement was used to
openly deny candidates on the basis of sex, race, religion, and/or
political affiliation, the ABA has led the way in promoting civil rights to
certain groups, like the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Questioning, and
Transgendered ("LGBQT") community, through its admissions
procedures long before these rights were achieved publicly.
Lastly, Part VI of this Article offers suggestions and solutions to
the implementation of the moral character requirement by maintaining
the importance and principle of regulation through the admissions
process, but avoiding discrimination and indeterminacy.
II.

FROM MOSES TO MCCARTHY: THE SUBJECTIVE EVOLUTION OF
MORAL CHARACTER

A.

Ancient and EuropeanFocus on Morals

The moral character requirement of the admissions process has a
long history that can be traced back to concepts found in the Old
Testament. When Moses "set about forming the government of [ancient]
Israel," God commanded him to choose God-fearing
men who would
18
law:
of
rule
the
through
will
God's
enforce
You shall represent the people before God, and bring their cases to
God; and you shall teach them the statutes and the decisions, and make
them know the way in which they must walk and what they must do.
Moreover choose able men from all the people, such as fear God, men

who are trustworthy and who hate a bribe; and place such men over the
people as rulers of thousands, of hundreds, of fifties, and of tens. And
let them judge the people at all times ....19

Fearing God and exhibiting His divinity-specifically through
trustworthiness and hatred of bribery-defined the requisite moral
character for the rulers of ancient times. 20 This bound the concept of
righteousness to the regulators of the law.
Like Moses, Aristotle in the fourth century B.C.E. believed public
orators, namely lawyers and politicians, should be "men of good
18. See Matthew A. Ritter, The Ethics of Moral Character Determination: An Indeterminate
Ethical Reflection upon Bar Admissions, 39 CAL. W. L. REv 1, 4(2002).
19. See id. at 4 (citing Exodus 18:19-22 (Rev. Standard Version)).
20. Exodus 18:19-22 (Rev. Standard Version).
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character" in order "to be effective
in convincing.
21
rightness of their arguments":

. .

audience[s] of the

But since rhetoric exists to affect the giving of decisions-the
hearers decide between one political speaker and another, and a legal
verdict is a decision-the orator must not only try to make the
argument of his speech demonstrative and worthy of belief; he must
also make his own character look right ....Particularly in political
oratory, but also in lawsuits, it adds much to an orator's influence that
his own character should look right and that he should be thought to
entertain the right feelings towards his hearers ....
There are three things which inspire confidence in the orator's own
character-the three, namely, that induce us to believe a thing apart
22
from any proof of it: good sense, good moral character, and goodwill.
Devolving from a focus on "righteousness," Aristotle, in a more
structured society based on the pursuit of reason, focused on "rightness."
In the fifth century C.E., the Roman Theodosian Code "required
that advocates be of 'suitable character' with past lives that were
praiseworthy. 23 The earliest form of licensing emerged in the thirteenth
century in France when "a university chancellor issued teaching licenses
(licentia docendi) in the fields of Law, Theology, and Medicine only to
those candidates examined and recommended by the majority of the
masters of the respective faculties ...,24
In early seventeenth century England, statutory law "required that
lawyers be 'skillful' and 'honest. ,,25 "The relationship between the
English Bar and the royal family played an important role in the
adoption of
'character' as a professional requirement of lawyers in
26
England.
"By the eighteenth century, the British legal profession had a
bifurcated structure" 27 with the upper branch consisting largely of
barristers, who practiced in court and were regulated by autonomous
Inns of Courts,28 while "[t]he lower branch, consisting of solicitors, was
21. Ritter, supra note 18, at 4.
22. See id. at 4-5 (citing ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC 90-91 (W. Rhys Roberts trans., 1954)).
23. Michael D. White, Comment, Good Moral Character and Admission to the Bar: A
ConstitutionallyInvalid Standard?,48 U. CN. L. REV. 876, 876 (1979).
24. Ritter, supra note 18, at 5.
25. Id.; see also Roger Roots, When Lawyers Were Serial Killers: Nineteenth Century Visions
of Good Moral Character,22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 19, 19 (2001) (citing S.H. BAILEY & M.J. GUNN,
SMITH AND BAILEY ON THE MODERN ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 115 (3d ed. 1996)).

26. Roots, supra note 25, at 20.
27. Rhode, supra note 14, at 494.
28. Id.
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governed by professional associations and rules of court, supplemented
by statutory enactments. ' 29 For the most part, wealth and social standing
dictated the ability of barristers to practice. For instance, "[diuring the
eighteenth century, some Inns waived certification requirements for sons
of powerful members, or for those with letters of recommendation from
judges. 30 Meanwhile, "the expense of legal education and establishing a
practice at the Inns of Court largely restricted access" to those from
families who could not afford it.3 1 In other cases, when de facto
exclusion based on income failed, more egregious forms of restriction
existed, as barristers excluded from Inn membership certain "unfit
groups, including Catholics, tradesmen, journalists, and solicitors. 32
Unfortunately, "members occasionally couched their exclusivity in terms
of personal integrity and character., 33 "Apart from these caste-bound
restraints, the profession's upper branch made little systematic effort to
probe the personal attributes of its members. 3 4
For solicitors, fitness to practice "was governed less by class and
more through formal regulation. 35 The poor practice standards of
solicitors prompted Parliament in the early eighteenth century "to pass a
comprehensive statute requiring, inter alia, five years of apprenticeship
and judicial examination of fitness and capacity for practice. 36 For the
most part, "[d]iscipline for immoral conduct was ...lax. Disbarment

rarely occurred even for.... [major] offenses, and the profession
enjoyed little public respect. ,' By 1874, Parliament statutorily required
of lawyers an apprenticeship as well as a judicial examination for
fitness.38
These early Anglican antecedents illustrate the subjectivity of the
moral character requirement and its ability to serve as an egregious form
of de facto exclusion in an increasingly democratizing society.

29. Id.
30, Id.
31. Id.

32. Id. (citing MICHAEL BIRKS, GENTLEMEN OF THE LAW 133 (1960); 12 WILLIAM
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 19 (1938)).
33. Roots, supra note 25, at 20 (citing WILFRID R. PREST, THE RISE OF THE BARRISTERS: A
SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH BAR 1590-1640, at 48 (1986)).
34. Rhode, supra note 14, at 495.
35. Id.
36. Id. (citing HOLDSWORTH, supra note 32, at 54-55).
37. Id. (citing BIRKS, supra note 32, at 109).
38. Roots, supra note 25, at 20.
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B. Land of the Free (From Regulations):
The UnregulatedLegal Market of the Nineteenth Century
Across the Atlantic, in pre-Revolutionary America, lawyers
enjoyed a substantially better reputation; 39 nevertheless, "several of the
colonies sought to banish them altogether., 40 Additionally, many
members of the Bar remained loyal to the British crown and left the
colonies during the American Revolution. 41 After they left, the lawyers
that remained were relatively incompetent but continued to practice
law. 42 The remaining lawyers' professional "blood-suck[ing]"
existence 43 came to be tolerated only because of character requirements
imposed by various State Bar associations 44 "as well as apprenticeships

and/or competency examinations. 45 The focus on character
requirements is expressed most clearly in a nineteenth century essay on
professional ethics, explaining that because lawyers control our
"fortunes, reputations, domestic peace.., nay, our liberty and life
itself .... [t]heir character must be not only without a stain, but without
suspicion. 46
Yet by the nineteenth century, during the Jacksonian era, Bar
admission requirements became increasingly less strict because of the
perceived elitism of admission practices as contrary to democratic
ideals.47 A 1985 study financed by the Stanford Legal Research Fund
found "almost no instances of denial of admission on character-related
grounds" in the nineteenth century.
There were few requirements for entry into the Bar; almost anyone
who desired to practice law could gain admittance. 49 For example, John
Adams recorded in his diary how he met a tavern keeper who acted as "a
sort of Lawyer among [tavern patrons] ... plead[ing] some of their...

39. Ritter, supra note 18, at 6 (citing HISTORY OF THE COLUMBUS BAR ASSOCIATION,
available at http://www.cbalaw.org/about/history.php).
40. Id.
41. Id. (citing HISTORY OF THE COLUMBUS BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 39).
42. Id.
43. Rhode, supra note 14, at 496 (quoting 2 ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 17 (1965)).
44. See Roots, supra note 25, at 21.
45. Ritter, supra note 18, at 6.
46. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 172 (3d ed. 1869).

47. Daniel R. Hansen, Note, Do We Need the Bar Examination? A CriticalEvaluation of the
Justificationsfor the Bar Examination and ProposedAlternatives, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1191,
1195 (1995) (citing CHROUST, supra note 43, at 165-66).
48. Rhode, supra note 14, at 497.
49. See Hansen, supra note 47, at 1195-96.
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[c]ases before the Justices and Arbitrators of the region. 5 ° In addition,
in the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote that "he often came across
'those who have been in turn lawyers, farmers, merchants, ministers of
the Gospel, and doctors." '' 51 In 1851, Indiana stipulated in its
constitution "that 'every person of good moral character, being a voter,
52
shall be entitled to admission to practice law in all courts of justice."'
Coupled with the restrictions on voting rights, propertied white men
defined moral character. Ohio only required applicants to certify that
they "had 'regularly and attentively studied law."' 5 3 New Hampshire
law, prior to the Civil War, "simply 'provided that any citizen over
twenty-one was entitled to be admitted to practice."'' 54 "By 1860, of the
thirty-nine states, only nine had any specific requirements for admission
to their Bar., 5 5 When character did not specifically restrict admission,
certain apprenticeship requirements did.56
After the Civil War, the possession of moral character conflated
with political posture in the readmission of Confederates into the Union.
The United States Congress enacted legislation requiring attorneys who
sought admission to the Federal Bar to swear an oath that they had not
given aid or held any office under "any authority or pretended authority
in hostility to the United States., 57 In its decision on the matter in the
case of Ex parte Garland, the Court refused to permit congressional
exclusion of lawyers from the practice of law due to former association
with the Confederacy; rather the Court held that although Congress may
impose qualifying standards upon entrance to the Federal Bar, a court
determines who is "qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney
and counselor, and for what cause he ought to be removed., 58 In its
decision the Court clarified that the power of determining who is
50. Roots, supra note 25, at 21 (citing BERNARD SCHWARTZ, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN
LEGAL THOUGHT 6 (1993) (quoting 2 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS 27 (L.H.
Butterfield ed., 1961))).
51. Id. (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 403 (J.P. Mayer ed.,
George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1988) (1966)).
52. Hansen, supra note 47, at 1195 (quoting THE BAR EXAMINERS' HANDBOOK, supra note 9,
at 15 (quoting IND. CONST. art. 7, § 21 (1851)).
53. Id. (quoting CHROUST, supra note 43, at 168).
54. Id. at 1196 (quoting ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA
FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S, at 9 (1983)).
55. Ritter, supra note 18, at 7.
56. See Hansen, supra note 47, at 1195.
57. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 335 (1866) (quoting Act to Prescribe an Oath of Office,

and for Other Purposes, ch. 128, 12 Stat. 502 (1862), repealed by Act Prescribing an Oath of Office
to be Taken by Persons from Whom Legal Disabilities Shall Have Been Removed, ch. 139, 15 Stat.

85(1868)).
58.

Id. at 347 (quoting Exparte Secombe, 60 U.S. 9, 11 (1856)).
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qualified and who is not "is not an arbitraryand despotic one, to be
exercised at pleasure of the court, or from passion, prejudice, or
personal hostility; but it is the duty of the court to exercise and regulate
it by sound and just judicial discretion ....

One of the only

requirements the Court specified for the practice of law was 60that
lawyers' "private and professional character shall appear to be fair.,
"Although... moral character remained requisite for admission to
the practice of law in many states, Bar membership was effectively open
at the end of the Civil War to any and all male citizens who could
produce a personal reference."'', A personal reference was not a high
hurdle to overcome, as "[a]ffidavits from personal references generally
satisfied admission requirements, and such documents were easily
obtained.",6 2 During the Jacksonian era, while admission standards were
being lowered or eliminated, "most states had some form of examination
requirement for Bar admission, either in addition to or in lieu of a period
of apprenticeship. However, the exams were inadequate because courts
neither had the time nor the skills to administer a professional
examination. 6 3 As a result, the State Bar examination remained casual.
An Illinois applicant remembered being examined by President Abraham
Lincoln while Lincoln was in the bath:
He asked me in a desultory way the definition of a contract, and two or
three fundamental questions, all of which I answered readily, and I
thought, correctly. Beyond these meager inquiries... he asked nothing
more. As he continued his toilet, he entertained me with
recollections-many of them characteristically vivid and racy---of his
early practice and the various incidents and adventures that attended
his start in the profession. The whole proceeding was so unusual and
queer, if not grotesque, that 64
I was at a loss to determine whether I was
really being examined at all.
Despite the seemingly open admission process and de facto
restriction of certain minority groups, women and blacks were excluded
from admission to the Bar more conspicuously. Women were seen as
timid, delicate, and polite. 65 Nineteenth century jurists felt that these

59. Id. (quoting Secombe, 60 U.S. at 13).
60. Id. at 336.
61. Ritter, supra note 18, at 7 (citing Rhode, supra note 14, at 497-98).
62. Rhode, supra note 14, at 497-98 (citation omitted).
63. Hansen, supra note 47, at 1196.
64. Id. (quoting Joel Seligman, Why the Bar Exam Should be Abolished, JUR. DR., Aug.-Sept.
1978, at 48).
65. See Rhode, supra note 14, at 497.
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alleged qualities thus precluded women from successfully practicing
law.66 Further, blacks faced outright racism, both in the North and, more
intensely, in the South. In 1847, the Bar in Allegheny County,
Pennsylvania, refused to admit George B. Vashon because he was
black.67 In Duval County, Florida, James Weldon Johnson, after passing
his oral examination, recalled that one examiner, unprepared to witness
the first black admitted to the Duval Bar, blurted out, "Well, I can't
forget he's a nigger and I'll be damned if I'll stay here to see him
admitted. ' 68
C. "Let's Take it Outside": Beatings, Canings, Stabbings, and Pistol
Duels in the Nineteenth Century
Generally, law in the nineteenth century "seemed to attract a firebreathing and intemperate breed of man., 69 In 1801, the Tennessee
legislature passed a law making dueling a crime and requiring that
lawyers take an oath upon admission to the Bar that they would not
engage in dueling.7 ° In fact, it was found that ninety percent of duels that
occurred in Tennessee were between lawyers. 7' In one instance of
intemperate lawyering, a "young Tennessee lawyer fatally stabbed a
sketch artist after the artist drew him in a humorous and satirical
fashion. 72 This is not to say such reckless and aggressive behavior was
limited to Tennessee. In Arkansas, a "superior court judge killed another
Arkansas superior court judge in a duel after the latter judge offended
the former's wife during a card game. 73 In Illinois:
Abraham Lincoln, one of America's greatest trial lawyers, as well as
our sixteenth President, was forced to the very brink of a saber duel
with thelllinois state auditor (another lawyer) after Lincoln was
identifiedas the author of embarrassing newspaper articles written
66. See id. For example, one Justice wrote, "[tihe natural and proper timidity and delicacy
which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many occupations of the civil life." Bradwell
v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
67. See J. CLAY SMITH JR., EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER 18441944, at 152 (1993).
68. JAMES WELDON JOHNSON, ALONG THIS WAY: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JAMES WELDON
JOHNSON 143 (1933), quoted by SMITH, supra note 67, at 279.

69. Roots, supra note 25, at 22.
70. Id. at 23 (citing DON C. SEITZ, FAMOUS AMERICAN DUELS: WITH SOME ACCOUNT OF THE
CAUSES THAT LED UP TO THEM AND THE MEN ENGAGED 29-30 (1966)).

71. Id. (citing SEITZ, supranote 70, at 30).
72. Id. at 24 (citing DICK STEWARD, DUELS AND THE ROOTS OF VIOLENCE IN MISSOURI 88
(2000)).
73. Id. (citing Lynn Foster, Their Pride and Ornament: Judge Benjamin Johnson and the
Federal Courts in Early Arkansas, 22 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L. REv. 21, 30 (1999)).
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under an alias in 1842. Lincoln avoided violence only by apologizing
in the moments before the duel. 74

The most well-known and adventurous dueling lawyer in the nineteenth
century was the seventh President of the United States, Andrew Jackson.
A decorated man in the military, Jackson certainly had exposure to
extensive violence, but this violence transcended his military profession:
Jackson partook in "at least 103 duels, fights, and altercations" in his
career as a lawyer and judge.75
"Legislative prohibitions against dueling posed [few] obstacle[s] to
obstinate... duelists. Lawyers in states with strong anti-dueling laws
simply arranged their skirmishes to take place on ground without such
laws.",76 For example, they would often duel on unregulated "Indian
Country. 7 7 Jackson's most famous duel in 1806 against Charles
Dickinson, another prominent Tennessee attorney, actually took place in
Kentucky to avoid Tennessee's anti-dueling statute.78
In addition to dueling lawyers, violence and intemperance also
prevailed among judges. One Florida judge heralded a lynch mob assault
on a courthouse in the 1880S. 79 Stephen J. Field, one of the longestserving United States Supreme Court justices as well as the architect of
much of American constitutional law in the late nineteenth century, "was
jailed and disbarred by a local judge for showing disrespect in the
courtroom. Afterward, Field wore a pistol [on his person] in anticipation
of a chance confrontation with [that specific] judge." 80 Although Field
actually followed the judge in public streets and saloons, he was later
readmitted to the Bar. 81 "Shortly after readmission... Field was
disbarred again for similar disrespect in the courtroom of the same
judge. 82 Nevertheless, he was later elected to the California Supreme
Court in 1857,83 and in 1863, nominated to the United States Supreme
84
Court.

74.

Id. (citing HAMILTON COCHRAN, NOTED AMERICAN DUELS AND HOSTILE ENCOUNTERS

126-28 (1963)).
75. See Roots, supra note 25, at 30-31.
76. Id. at 25.
77. id.
78. Id. at 30.
79. See Rhode, supra note 14, at 498 n.23.
80. Roots, supranote 25, at 28 (citing CARL BRENT SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD: CRAFTSMAN
OF THE LAW 38-41 (1930)).
81. Id. (citing SWISHER, supra note 80, at 40).
82. Id. (citing SWISHER, supra note 80, at 42-43).
83. Id. (citing SWISHER, supra note 80, at 72-75).

84. Id. (citing SCHWARTZ, supra note 50, at 308).
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By the nineteenth century, lawyers and judges, the protectors of the
law, were rarely disbarred or rejected for questionable activity and
behavior that occurred in the past. In fact, according to Roger Roots,
who has specifically studied morality among lawyers in the nineteenth
century, "the record seems bare of any attempts at barring or disbarring
such individuals from the practice of law for their activities outside the
courtroom., 85 Instead, "[d]enial of admission and disbarment were
or for serious crimes
generally reserved for courtroom-related conduct
86
committed in the course of practicing law."
D. When Morals Become Standardizedand Anglicized:
The Turn-of-the-Century Shift Towards TargetedRegulation and the
Black and Jewish Response
"The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed a
marked increase in interest in character certification across many
professions. 87 During this time, other professions also began restricting
entry standards and initiating character requirements for occupational
licensing. 88 These groups "included barbers, beauticians, embalmers,
engineers, veterinarians, optometrists, geologists, shorthand reporters,
dogs
commercial photographers, boxers, piano tuners, trainers of guide
89
for the blind, and-[interestingly] enough-vendors of erotica.
"The radical democratization of Bar admissions prompted
90
widespread calls for its reform in the later nineteenth century.
Expanding post-war industrialization increased concern over the
character certification and competency of lawyers to deal with the

85. Roots, supra note 25, at 34.
86. Id. Roots cites several cases of interest, including Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1883), in
which the Court stated, "[W]here an attorney has been fraudulently admitted, or convicted (after
admission) of felony, or other offense which renders him unfit to be continued an attorney,... the
court will order him to be struck off the roll." Id. at 273. This case involved the disbarment of an
attorney who defended John Suratt. Suratt was an accused murderer of Abraham Lincoln. While the
trial was pending:
[T]he defense attorney assaulted the presiding judge as the judge descended from the
bench. The U.S. Supreme Court held that although the judge was justified in
immediately disbarring the attorney from practice before his own court, the judge could

not summarily disbar the attorney from practicing before other courts in the District of
Columbia.
Roots, supranote 25, at 34 n. 119 (internal citation omitted).

87.
88.
89.

Rhode, supra note 14, at 498.
Id. at 499.
id.

90. See Ritter, supra note 18, at 8.
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extensive legalization of the social economy. 9' The ABA was founded in
1878 and "fronted the professional movement toward establishing more
' 92
stringent and uniform standards for both competence and character.
At the time, the ABA defined its mission as "the advancement of the
science of jurisprudence, the promotion of the administration of justice
and a uniformity of legislation throughout the country .... A
dissenting opinion in 1906 by a North Carolina judge in a licensure case
articulated this redefined jurisprudential concern for moral character this
way:
The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to

the practice of the law unless he possessed an upright moral character.
The possession of this by the attorney is more important, if anything,
to the public
and to the proper administration of justice, than legal
94
learning.

The moral character requirement for modem admissions gradually
evolved from an ideal into a more systematic and centralized form of
regulation. "Between 1880 and 1920, states adopted additional entry
procedures, such as publication of applicants' names, probationary
admissions, recommendations by the local Bar, court-directed inquiries,
and investigation by character committees."9 5 "By 1917, three-quarters
of the states had centralized certification authority in boards of bar
examiners., 96 By 1927, nearly two-thirds of all jurisdictions made
"further efforts to strengthen character inquiries through mandatory
interviews, character questionnaires, committee oversight, or related
measures." 97 Gradually, "these certification requirements.., stiffened
through the 1930s, [primarily] in response to efforts by the newly
formed National
Conference of Bar Examiners, and various bar
98
associations.
However, class and ethnic biases defined the implementation of the
principle of moral character. Indeed, "[w]hile the quest [for moral
91. Id.
92. Id.; see Profile of the American Bar Association (Feb. 2008), available at
http://www.abanet.org/media/profile.pdf.
93. Profile of the American Bar Association, supranote 92.
94. In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 642 (N.C. 1906) (Brown, J., dissenting).
95. Rhode, supra note 14, at 499 (citing Clarence A. Lightner, A More Complete Inquiry into
the Moral Characterof Applicantsfor Admission to the Bar, 38 REP. A.B.A. 775, 781-82 (1913)).

96. Id. (citing STEVENS, supra note 54, at 105 n.23).
97. Id. (citing Committee on Legal Education of the Massachusetts Bar Association, Training
for the Bar with Specials Reference to the Admission Requirements in Massachusetts, MASS. L.Q.,

Nov. 1929, at 44-78 (summarizing that state's procedures)).
98. Id. (citing STEVENS, supra note 54, at 105 n.23).
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character and fitness] was 'aimed in principle against incompetence,
crass commercialism, and unethical behavior,' the ostensibly 'illprepared' and 'morally weak' candidates were often in fact 'of foreign
parentage, and, most pointedly, Jews."' 99 Much of the initial drive for
more stringent character scrutiny emerged "in response to an influx of
Eastern European immigrants, which threatened the profession's public
standing. Nativist and ethnic prejudices during the 1920's, coupled with
economic pressures during the ...Depression, [further] fueled [this]
renewed drive for entry barriers."' 00 Character requirements were not the
sole preventive measure. Other preventive measures in addition to the
moral character requirement were created through institutionalized
restrictive barriers towards immigrants, such as educational and ethical
requirements which poor immigrants failed to possess, including
thorough knowledge of the King's English and the available funds for a
law school education. 10 1
Under Pennsylvania's registration and preceptorship system in
1928, "prospective candidates faced a character investigation both at the
beginning of law school and at the time of applying for admission to the
state bar.... [t]he initial character interview afforded an opportunity to
dissuade the 'unworthy' candidates from pursuing" law, which, at the
time, involved a lot of applications from Jews. 102 "Character and fitness
requirements were directed mainly at southern European men since there
were far more effective barriers to entrance for women and racial
minorities." 10 3 The subjectivity of an "unworthy" standard provided
plenty of leeway for the rejection of a substantial number of individuals
that, according to the justifications of examiners, had no "proper sense
of right and wrong" and others that had no "moral or intellectual
stamina., 10 4 Ultimately, during the first eight years of the Philadelphia
character
program, the focus on only admitting applicants with moral
10 5
reduced the proportion of Jews admitted by sixteen percent.
This is not to say these barriers went unchallenged. Blacks and
Jews often allied together and fought against discrimination within the
99. Id. at 500 (quoting MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A
SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 173 (1977)).

100. Id. at499-500.
101. Id.at 500.
102. Id.
103. Patrick L. Baude, An Essay on the Regulation of the Legal Profession and the Future of
Lawyers' Characters,68 IND. L.J. 647, 649 (1993).
104. Rhode, supra note 14, at 501 (citing -Walter C. Douglas, The Pennsylvania System
GoverningAdmission to the Bar, 54 REP. A.B.A. 701, 703-05 (1929)).
105. Id.
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legal profession. For example, Ellis Rivers, a black graduate of
Columbia Law School during the early twentieth century, had his
application for membership to the New York State Bar Association
rejected on the grounds of race. 106 Rivers worked with Louis Marshall to
become admitted:
In 1923, Louis Marshall, who at the time was President of the
American Jewish Committee and a member of the board of the
NAACP, led a group of prominent lawyers that forced the New York
State Bar Association to admit Rivers, and in 1929 Rivers became the
first black admitted to the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York. By 1942, Rivers, who had become a Manhattan prosecutor,
attempted to break the color barrier of the [ABA]. When the ABA
refused to admit him-solely on the basis of race-Jonah Goldstein,
by this time a judge in New York City, resigned in protest. This led to
other resignations, and in 1943 the ABA changed its policy declaring
07
that membership was "not dependent upon race, creed or color."
Similarly, in 1927, Hugh Ellwood Macbeth, Sr., a black graduate of
Harvard Law School, "led a group of black and Jewish lawyers in
successfully challenging the exclusion of both groups from the
California Bar Association. ' 08
E. A Colorblind Court: The Subjugation of McCarthyism and the
Emergence of Rationality
In most states, character certification after the 1930s grew more
rigorous in form, becoming increasingly systematic, as definitions of
virtue shifted with the national mood. During the mid-twentieth century,
the rising fear of Communism and the pervasiveness of McCarthyism
influenced several admission decisions as applicants were rejected for
Communistic activities. Ultimately, via appeals, several monumental
cases paved the way for the qualification of the moral character
requirement with the practice of law. Today, a state's standard for moral
character in terms of Bar admissions must have some rational connection
to the practice of law.'0 9
The most significant and popular case in Bar admissions was
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, which qualified moral character

106. Paul Finkelman, Not Only the Judges' Robes Were Black: African-American Lawyers as
Social Engineers,47 STAN. L. REv. 161, 205 (1994) (reviewing SMITH, supra note 67).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 353 U.S. 232, 246 (1957).
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with fitness to practice law. 110 In that case, the application of the
petitioner was denied on the ground that he had not shown good moral
character, in view of his past membership in the Communist Party, his
use of aliases, and his record of arrest.' 11 In its decision, on certiorari, the
Supreme Court of the United States reversed the judgment against
Schware on the ground that the petitioner's exclusion from the practice
of law violated due process, since upon the record the New Mexico
Supreme Court could not reasonably find that the petitioner had not
shown good moral character.1 12 In fact, the court found him to be "a man
of high ideals with a deep sense of social justice" who actually used
aliases "for the purpose of forestalling anti-Semitism in securing
employment,"1 13 and, at the occasion of a mass arrest during a labor
14
dispute, for the purpose of avoiding his being discharged as a striker.1
In its decision, the Court judged that any state qualification for Bar
admission must "have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness
or capacity to practice law."' 15 In Schware, the Supreme Court rejected
the intrusion of McCarthyism, affirming that a Bar applicant's political
16
beliefs are sacred, unless they affect his ability to adequately practice. 1
III.

THE BENEFITS OF THE CURRENT MORAL CHARACTER
REQUIREMENT

Whereas the history of the moral character requirement in Bar
admissions during the nineteenth and early twentieth century illuminates
a prejudicial moralist intrusion in the admissions process, the case of
Schware alternatively illustrates a divergence from a regrettable past.
Today, there is no question character committees focus more on judging
an applicant's fitness to practice rather than subjectively attempting to
discern an applicant's underlying moral character. Despite the
exclusionary tactics of character screening in the past, all states continue
to use a redefined, more formal and standard system of evaluating
character as a requirement for present-day Bar admission. For the most
part, only if an applicant is flagged with a substantially problematic
history is his or her application up for review.

110.

See id. at 239.

Ill.
112.
113.

Id. at 240-45.
ld. at 247.
Id. at 240.

114.

Id. at 241.

115. Id. at 239.
116. Id. at246-47.
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In principle, the ABA openly defends present character evaluations
as necessary for both "the protection of the public and the system of
justice,"1 17 and rightly so considering the public's perception of the legal
profession, the need to preserve the dignity of the law, the extent of
problems among current lawyers, and notable admissions cases in the
past that have proved to exclude problematic figures.
A.

The Truth Hurts: The Need to Regulate Against CorruptLawyers

The predominant justification for the inclusion of the moral
character requirement in modem-day Bar admissions is to adequately
protect the public. "Those involved in the character certification process
have almost uniformly identified its central justification as protecting the
public."' 18 In his concurring opinion in Schware, Justice Frankfurter
observed, "all the interests of man that are comprised under the
constitutional guarantees of 'life, liberty and property' are in the
professional keeping of lawyers."' 1 9 The ABA agrees that it is the Bar's
duty to protect the public against substandard practitioners.1 20 The ABA,
along with the National Conference of Bar Examiners and the
Association of American Law Schools, states that the public has an
interest in securing representation by attomeys who have been certified
as "worthy of the trust and confidence clients may reasonably place in
their lawyers."' 2 According to these organizations, testing for "minimal
competence," through the Bar examination and other standards is
inadequate unless the system evaluates "character and fitness as those
elements relate to the practice of law." 12 2 This system of character
regulation assumes that the public will not be adequately protected
against bad lawyers without investigations to eliminate less reputable
individuals from attaining membership to the Bar. It is the ABA's belief
and duty to anyone in need of a lawyer that character standards will
prevent unscrupulous individuals from joining the legal profession.
The Bar also seeks to protect its own image and the legal profession
in general. A less recognized factor, but a determinative one, in character
screening is the need to preserve, or more adequately, establish a sense

117. RECOMMENDED STANDARDS FOR BAR EXAMINERS, supra note 16, at 111. 13.
118. Rhode, supra note 14, at 507.
119. Schware, 353 U.S. at 247 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
120.

See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-2 (1983) ("The public should be

protected from those who are not qualified to be lawyers by reason of a deficiency in education or
moral standards or of other relevant factors but who nevertheless seek to practice law.").
121.

RECOMMENDED STANDARDS FOR BAR EXAM'RS, supra note 16, at 111.7.

122. Id.
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of professionalism in law. A fairly recent Harris Poll illustrates the
public's lack of trust in lawyers. 123 When asked whether or not lawyers
are trustworthy, 27% of respondents surveyed said they would trust
lawyers to tell the truth, while 68% said they would not trust lawyers to
tell the truth. 124 The results of the public opinion poll, which is
assumedly based on prior experience along with popular culture, placed
lawyers at the bottom of the ladder.125 In a privately-funded study
conducted by the ABA on the public's perception of the legal profession,
the ABA found that trust and confidence in lawyers is even worse than
the Harris Poll indicated. 26 According to the study funded by the ABA,
14% clients felt "Extremely/Very Confident" in lawyers,12 which is in
stark contrast to other less stringently regulated professions, including
medical care and accounting, which garnered a "fairly healthy" amount
28
of confidence. 1
The ABA now seeks to screen out dishonest applicants through the
moral character requirement in order to protect the public and the system
of justice, preserving the professionalism of the occupation as well as the
fairness of the law. Even if only a minimal amount of applicants are
rejected in the admissions process, 2 9 the Bar owes it to the public and
the profession to stand behind pre-regulatory methods. With no character
screening, the Bar cannot claim to protect the interests of the American
people or the American system of justice as it waits for corrupt lawyers
to emerge only after mishandling clients' trust and tainting the legal
profession.
B. Does the Process Work?
The Infamous Admissions Rejection of Matthew F. Hale
In 1998, Matthew F. Hale received a Juris Doctor degree from
Southern Illinois University School of Law at Carbondale' 30 and

123. See Harris Interactive, Inc., Doctors and Teachers Most Trusted Among 22 Occupations
and Professions:Fewer Adults Trust the President to Tell the Truth: Actors and Lawyers at Bottom,
with Pollsters also Fairing Poorly (Aug. 8, 2006), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/
harrispoll/index.asp?PID=688.
124. Id.
125. Seeid.
126. See PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. JUSTICE SYSTEM 7 (1999),
available at

http://www.abanet.org/media/perception/perceptions.pdf.
127.

Id. at 50.

128.

Id. at 49.

129. See Ralph S. Brown, Jr. & John D. Fassett, Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar, 20 U.
CHI. L. REv. 480, 497 (1953).
130. HAZARD, JR. ET. AL., supra note 17, at 876.
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successfully passed the Illinois State Bar examination in the same
year. 13 1 Despite fulfilling these requirements to practice law in the state
of Illinois, a three-member Inquiry Panel "refused to certify him for
admission to the Illinois Bar in February of 1999" because of his failure
to prove he was of good moral character.132 While the majority of
applicants up for review in 1998 were flagged because of admitting to
prior criminal activity,133 Hale's application was flagged because of a
much more subjective 34reason: suspicion of his moral character and
ability to practice law.'
In October 1995, Hale became the head of an organization called
the World Church of the Creator ("WCOTC"), which claims to be a
religious organization, while Hale assumed the title of Pontifex
Maximus (Latin for "Supreme Leader").135 According to its founder,
Ben Klassen, the WCOTC has as one of its major tenets the hatred of
blacks, Jews, and other minorities. 136 This hatred peppers the
commandments and literature of the WCOTC. For example,
the "Seventh Commandment" of Hale's religion [asks] members to
show preferential treatment in business dealings to "members of your
own race"-meaning whites. The "Seventh Commandment" continues:
"Phase out all dealings with Jews as soon as possible. Do not employ
niggers or other coloreds.137Have social contacts only with members of
your own racial family."'
The underlying racism and anti-Semitism defining the WCOTC
illustrates the extent of Hale's bigotry: He was a self-professed racist
and anti-Semite. As a result of these views, the Inquiry Panel in a
majority opinion rejected Hale:
While Matthew Hale has not yet threatened to exterminate anyone,
history tells us the extermination is sometimes not far behind when
government power is held by persons of his racial views. The Bar of
Illinois cannot certify someone as having good moral character and
131.
Richard L. Sloane, Note, Barbarian at the Gates: Revisiting the Case of Matthew F. Hale
to Reaffirm that Character and Fitness Evaluations Appropriately Preclude Racists from the
Practice of Law, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 397,417 (2002).
132. Id. at 420.
133. See Mark Schauerte, Illinois Denies Law License to Vocal Racist, ST. Louis POSTDISPATCH, Feb. 22, 1999, at Al.
134. See id.
135. HAZARD, JR. ET. AL., supra note 17, at 876.

136. Id.
137. Sloane, supra note 131, at 419-20 (quoting WORLD CHURCH OF THE CREATOR, WORLD
CHURCH OF THE CREATOR MEMBERSHIP MANUAL 6, available at http://www.archive.org (search
"Creator Membership Manual"; then follow "pdf' hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 26, 2008)).
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general fitness to practice law who has dedicated his life to inciting
racial hatred for the purpose of implementing those views.138
Hale appealed the decision before the Third District Character and
Fitness Committee's five-member panel on April 10, 1999.139 In a
complaint, Hale, "a well-known and vigorous advocate of racist and
anti-Semitic ideas," claimed that he "was barred from the legal
profession and denied his livelihood because the individuals sitting on
the Committee of Character and Fitness for the State of Illinois
happened to disagree-strongly-with [his] political and religious
views." 140 His complaint continued, arguing that "[t]o describe the denial
of [his] application to practice law, then, is to illustrate the profound
dangers it poses to the most basic and valued liberties guaranteed to all
citizens by the United States Constitution."' 14 1 But Hale's racism was not
in question as much as the extent to which this racism would affect his
fitness to practice. As in Schware, the case boiled down to Hale's fitness
to practice and adequately represent all of his clients regardless of their
race or religious faith.
Ultimately, Hale was again denied admission with the opinion of
the majority expressing: "The Bar of Illinois cannot certify someone as
having good moral character and general fitness to practice law who has
dedicated his life to inciting racial hatred." 142 Sure enough, following
this decision, one of Hale's closest friends and character witness,
Benjamin Smith, went on a shooting spree targeting twenty minorities,
killing two men, and wounding nine Orthodox Jews and AfricanAmericans.1 43 Certainly the anti-violence stance Hale claimed the
WCOTC possessed was called into question, even more so after Hale
essentially justified Smith's violent acts as "an example of what happens
when people at least perceive their freedom of speech is being
disrupted." 144
In the Hale case, the character committee read the writing on the
wall and its regulatory procedures successfully precluded granting Hale
the privilege to practice law by finding him unfit.
HAZARD, JR. ET. AL., supra note 17, at 883-84.
139. Sloane, supra note 131, at 420-21 (citing Molly McDonough, St. Louis Lawyer Can
RepresentRacist Before High Court:Justices, CHICAGO DAILY BULL., Aug. 3, 1999, at 3).

138.

140. Complaint at 2, Hale v. Comm. on Character and Fitness, 335 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2003)
(No. 02-1716).
141. Id.
142. HAZARD, JR. ET. AL., supra note 17, at 883-84.
143. Sloane, supra note 13 1, at 425.
144. Molly McDonough, Spree Shooter, Would-be Lawyer Shared Racist Goal, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., July 6, 1999, at 1.
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The good moral character requirement of the past, which served to
subjectively prevent minority applicants from admission, is now almost
completely integrated in the fitness to practice standard.1 45 However, the
prevalence of the moral relativism debate in Hale suggests that an
applicant may have questionable moral character, as Hale evidently did,
and still be admitted to the Bar. That is because what concerned the
Committee more than judging the goodness of Hale's character was the
extent to which his character infringed on his duties as an attorney.
Ultimately, the Committee's decision was founded on Hale's
questionable credibility: although he said he could adequately defend
1 46
and work with anyone, the Committee rightfully did not believe him.
C. A PredictiveMethod With PredictiveResults?
Not all applicants applying to the Bar engage in such public
displays of character like Hale. Thus, the need for a "rational
connection" between an applicant's moral character and the practice of
law has resulted in heightened scrutiny of an applicant's prior and
current conduct as part of the Bar admission process.1 47 Logically,
character committees assume that if an applicant has committed
misconduct in the past he or she will presumably act badly again.
Although this is a rational premise, it is a controversial premise in the
context of the Bar admissions process.1 48 Indeed, it is impossible to say
for certain whether Matthew Hale would have broken the law as a
lawyer, although this author would bet that he would.
Several studies and major opinions contradict each other over
whether a predictive technique works and if there is a correlation
between applicants with problem histories who are admitted to the Bar
and later disciplinary action. The Minnesota Board Bar of Examiners
organized a small, confidential study supporting a correlation between
problem histories and later disciplinary actions:
The Board is currently studying the records of a small sample of
applicants who, subsequent to admission, were disciplined for
professional misconduct. The study appears to indicate that those
applicants who disclosed character and fitness problems upon

145. See Hale v. Ill. Comm. on Character & Fitness, 335 F.3d 678, 680 (7th Cir. 2003).
146. Seeid. at680-81.
147. See Michael K. McChrystal, A Structural Analysis of the Good Moral Character
Requirementfor Bar Admission, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 67, 86-92 (1984).

148.

Id.
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to
application for admission are more likely than other applicants
149
engage in conduct which later results in professional discipline.
In the same breath, the Board clarified that regardless of the final
outcome of the study, empirical evidence is unnecessary considering that
common sense dictates that "an applicant with a track record of
fraudulent conduct is more likely to engage in fraudulent practices as an
attorney." 150 Justice Brown, in a dissenting opinion in the In re
Applicants for License matter, expressed the same justification for the
admissions process arguing that
if the applicant passes the threshold of the Bar with a bad moral
character, the chances are that his character will remain bad, and that
he will become a disgrace, instead of an ornament, to his great calling,
a curse, instead of a benefit, to his community, a151Quirk, a Gammon, or
a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith, or a Ruffin.
Nevertheless, despite arguments for correlation and justification for
the current system of judging moral character through subjective
screening, the Michigan State Bar's Regulation Counsel's office finds
no such correlation. 15 In a study comparing outcomes of the Character
and Fitness process with disciplinary actions subsequently taken against
attorneys by the Attorney Discipline Board, the Michigan Bar explains
that "[i]nformal tracking in recent years has shown no correlation
between 'problem' Character and Fitness histories and later disciplinary
actions." 153 That may be partially because in some states' admissions
process, the reliance on prior conduct as an indicative factor of future
wrongdoing results in character committees scrutinizing an applicant's
1 54
"divorce, cohabitation, and even violation of fishing license statutes"
to determine character, despite the fact that several organized empirical
research studies have established "no correlation between 'problem'
'' 55
applications and later disciplinary proceedings."

149. Baude, supra note 103, at 651 (quoting Letter from Margaret Fuller Cornielle, Dir., Minn.
Bd. of Law Exam'rs, to Robert J. Munson, President, Minn. State Bar. Ass'n 8 (Sep. 3, 1991)

[hereinafter Comielle Letter]).
150.

Id.

151. 55 S.E. 635, 642 (N.C. 1906) (Brown, J., dissenting).
152. D. Larkin Chenault, It Begins With Character-.... 77 MICH. B.J. 138, 139 (1998)
(discussing tracking in Michigan).
153.

Id.

154. Roots, supra note 25, at 35 (internal citations omitted).
155. Id. (citing Chenault, supra note 152, at 139).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol36/iss4/2

22

Langford: Barbarians at the Bar: Regulations of the Legal Profession Throug
2008]
IV.

BARBARIANS AT THE BAR
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STANDARD: THE WOES OF INDETERMINACY

Although the rationale behind the moral character requirement is
understandable, the current system's indeterminacy and inconsistency
poses major problems for applicants to the Bar and for the Board of
Examiners vested with the responsibility of regulating the legal field.
Although most states have come to define what constitutes "good
[moral] character," it can include such vague characteristics such as
"honesty, trustworthiness, diligence, reliability, respect for the law,
integrity, candor, discretion, observance of fiduciary duty, respect for the
rights of others, fiscal responsibility, physical ability to practice law,
knowledge of the law, mental and emotional stability, and a commitment
to the judicial process."'' 56 Similarly, the ABA has general moral
character factors like:
*
"
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

unlawful conduct
academic misconduct
making of false statements, including omissions
misconduct in employment
acts involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation
abuse of the legal process
neglect of financial responsibilities
neglect of professional obligations
violation of an order of a court
evidence of mental or emotional instability
evidence of drug or alcohol dependency
denial of admission to the Bar in another jurisdiction on
character and fitness grounds
disciplinary action by a lawyer disciplinary agency 57or other
professional disciplinary agency of any jurisdiction.1

Although general standards are promoted by the ABA and several
Bars, the insularity of state Bars caused by the confidentiality of
previous admissions cases and the inherent subjectivity of the moral
character requirement raise major issues.
The inherent subjectivity of the moral character requirement and
the subsequent issues therein were highlighted in Konigsberg v. State
Bar of California.5 8 Konigsberg's application was flagged when it
156. Ratcliff, supra note 1, at 495 ("However, at least seventeen states avoid the problems
involved in describing the relevant character traits that make up good character by not publishing
guidelines.").
157. These eleven criteria for inquiry are set forth in: RECOMMENDED STANDARDS FOR BAR
EXAMINERS, supranote 16, at 111.13.
158. 353 U.S. 252, 262-63 (1957).
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became apparent that Konigsberg attended Communist Party meetings in
1941, despite the fact that the Communist Party was a legitimate
American political party at the time. Ultimately he was denied admission
to the Bar, but not because his Communist ties related to any moral
turpitude; rather, he was rejected because he refused to answer questions
probing into his Communist ties, claiming that under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments a state could not inquire into a person's
political opinions or associations.1 59 In the decision, Justice Hugo Black
digressed and expressed his weariness with moral character being used
as a requirement in Bar admissions:
The term "good moral character" has long been used as a qualification
for membership in the Bar and has served a useful purpose in this
respect. However the term, by itself, is unusually ambiguous. It can be
defined in an almost unlimited number of ways for any definition will
necessarily reflect the attitudes, experiences, and prejudices of the
definer. Such a vague qualification, which is easily adapted to fit
personal views and predilections, can be a dangerous instrument
for
160
arbitrary and discriminatory denial of the right to practice law.
The arbitrariness of the moral character requirement may no longer
allow openly denying a candidate because of his or her sex, race,
religion, and/or political affiliation as it did in the past, but its proclivity
towards excluding whoever is deemed "unfit" naturally isolates certain
groups of candidates as determined by the people who decide whether or
not the applicant has good or bad moral character. Even though very few
applicants have been formally denied admission, "the number deterred,
delayed, or harassed [based on the moral character requirement] has
been more substantial. In the absence of meaningful standards or
professional consensus, the filtering
process has proved inconsistent,
1 61
idiosyncratic, and... intrusive."
A. To Be a Godfor a Day:
The Committee that Determines Good and Evil
While the standard Bar exam is grounded in objectivity, the moral
character requirement is not based on a score or a percentile; rather, a
character committee or a Board of Bar Examiners determines whether or
not an applicant demonstrates good moral character without using a

159. Id. at 258-59.
160. Id. at 262-63.
161. Rhode, supra note 14, at 494.
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grading system. 162 In most every case, the character committee or Board
of Bar Examiners is comprised only of lawyers. 163 In fact, "[1]ess than
one quarter of all states allow for limited lay membership on such
boards. ' 64 In those states allowing lay participation in the screening
process, laypersons generally represent a small minority of the total
board and are generally chosen by members of the profession.1 65 This
promotion of a "professional image standard" reinforces "the beliefs that
members of a profession hold toward that profession: what it is; what it
should be; and what it should not be."' 166 The oversight of moral fitness
is pretty much managed exclusively by members of the legal
profession. 167
Laypersons are not the only group not represented on character
committees: "The majority of committee members ... come from large
or medium-sized firms.' 68 As a result, "[p]ublic interest groups, solo
practitioners, government employees, and academicians are rarely
represented on character committees. The profession's exclusion of
entire segments of its own constituency as well as members of the lay
public from membership on moral character committees necessarily
limits the diversity of views represented on these committees."'' 69 "Since
bar organizations play a dominant role in selecting members,
committees may.. . be skewed toward established, mainstream
practitioners . . .. 170 Describing moral fitness in terms of the shared
experiences of only a few instead of in connection to the state's purposes
changes the moral fitness standard from an instrument
of the state into a
7'
profession.'
legal
the
of
portion
selected
a
tool for
Suspicions relating to the exclusion of nonconformist lawyers and
laypersons from character committees are heightened because of the
secrecy and confidentiality surrounding many State Bar organizations.
For instance, in California, information may not be easily found
regarding the makeup of the Moral Character Subcommittee, even after

162.

See M.A. Cunningham, Comment, The ProfessionalImage Standard:An Untold Standard

ofAdmission to the Bar, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1015, 1024 (1992).

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Id.
See Rhode, supra note 14, at 505.
See Cunningham, supra note 162, at 1021.
Rhode, supra note 14, at 505.
Cunningham, supra note 162, at 1025.
Id.
Rhode, supra note 14, at 506.
Cunningham, supra note 162, at 1025.
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scouring the California State Bar Association's website172 and leaving
three unretumed voicemails with the State Bar's Admissions
Department by this author's law clerks. 73 Only after repeatedly
telephoning the State Bar over the course of two weeks were the names
of the eight people making up the Moral Character Subcommittee of the
California State Bar eventually e-mailed.174 Even then, these eight names
alone meant very little, and an exhaustive Internet search for individual
biographical information on each committee member did not prove very
fruitful.
When the California State Bar was asked for the background of its
committee members, the Bar claimed no such background records
existed on file; 175 instead, it recommended a search on the State Bar's
website, 176 which only registered a few matches, and those biographies
were limited to name, business address, law school attended, and
disciplinary record, if any. In Illinois .(the home of the ABA) and in New
York, no information could be found on each State Bar's respective
website. 77 The Illinois State Bar did not respond to several requests this
author's law clerks made by voicemail. The New York Bar, along with
the Florida State Bar, explained that a request must be made in writing
and then approved prior to information being released. 78 This is
somewhat understandable to protect the identity of committee members
from a potentially dangerous situation, but it seems unfair that a flagged
applicant, whose history is laid bare for judgment, is incapable of
exploring the character of his determiners. This author's inquiries
demonstrate an insularity to character determination that, combined with

172. See
The
State
Bar of California,
Committee
http://calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbar.generic.jsp?cid=10127&id=1085

of Bar
Examiners,
(last visited August 26,

2008). The site states only that the Committee is "composed of 10 attorneys, including one young

lawyer member admitted three years or less before the time of his or her appointment, and nine
public members (who must not be members of the State Bar or admitted to practice before any court
in the United States)." Id. It does not, however, provide any information on the individual members
who comprise the Committee. See id.
173. Voice messages were left with the Admissions Department on May 31, June 5, and June
7, 2007.

174. E-mail from Diane Curtis, Public Information Officer, The State Bar of California, to
Tom Sansani (June 12, 2007, 14:29 EST) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review).
175. E-mail from Diane Curtis, Public Information Officer, The State Bar of California, to
Tom Sansani (June 13, 2007, 13:35 EST) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review).

176. E-mail from Diane Curtis, Public Information Officer, The State Bar of California, to
Tom Sansani (June 13, 2007, 13:41 EST) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review).

177. See Illinois State Bar Association, http://www.illinoisbar.org (last visited May 23, 2008);
New York State Bar Association, http://www.nysba.org (last visited May 23, 2008).
178.

Telephone Conversation with Receptionist, Fla. State Bar (Aug. 1, 2007, 11:07 EST).
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the make-up of the committees, render the process perhaps too
subjective.
B. Ex-Felons and the Disabled
The Outliers in Modern Day Admissions
The inherent vagueness of the good moral character standard has
resulted in newly-defined alienated groups. It is true that state Bars have
come a long way from their past open discrimination against women,
Blacks, and Jews. However, a strict focus on fitness to practice and
scrutiny of prior records has resulted in the targeting of ex-felons and the
mentally impaired.
Because prior criminal conduct is far and away the most common
indicator of bad moral character for character committees, ex-felons,
even those with records of good behavior in prison and post-prison, are
primarily excluded from the legal profession. Bruce E. May argues that
this prevents ex-felons from pursuing "gainful employment
opportunities" in the law as well as many other occupational licensing
professions. 179 In fact, one author opines that "[i]n some states virtually
the only 'profession' open to an [ex-felon] is that of burglar; he is barred
from other activities because he is presumed to be a person of bad moral
character, regardless of the nature of the [crime] or its relevance to his
intended occupation."'1 80 Although the far-reaching impact of licensing
laws on ex-felons raises questions as to whether such laws violate Equal
Protection, the rational basis requirement is nearly impossible to
challenge on equal protection grounds because convicted felons are not
considered a suspect class unless a state specifically provides them
protection.1 81 Therefore if an ex-felon has a conviction for burglary, the
character committee has a strong enough rational basis to question his or
her moral character and ability to handle funds for clients, despite good
behavior since the crime.
Ex-felons are not the only group targeted by current screening
practices. A survey conducted by the Utah State Bar Association reveals
that most states incorporate mental health inquiries in their Bar
application evaluation. 82 In terms of probing the character of a mentally
179. Bruce E. May, The CharacterComponent of OccupationalLicensing Laws: A Continuing
Barrierto the Ex-Felon 's Employment Opportunities, 71 N.D. L. REV. 187, 188 (1995).
180. Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse of OccupationalLicensing, 44 U. CHi. L. REV. 6, 13 (1976).
181. See Furst v. New York City Transit Auth., 631 F. Supp. 1331, 1336-37 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
182. Gail Edison, Comment, Mental Health Status Inquiries on Bar Applications: Overbroad
and Intrusive, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 869, 870 (1995) (citing Informal Survey of the Character and

Fitness Comm. of the Utah State Bar (1994)).
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disabled applicant, prior conduct is not as important for character
committees as a current examination focusing on the applicant's fitness
to practice with his or her mental disability. Indeed, "in the past few
decades Bar admission authorities have made inquiries into treatment for
mental disorders and substance abuse a routine component
' 83
of ...character screening."'
These screening processes have come under fire since the
enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") of 1990.184
The ADA was enacted "to provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities."' 185 Those who oppose intrusive mental health questions
posed by Bar admissions authorities have pointed to the serious harms
that can be inflicted by these inquiries, such as the embarrassment felt by
applicants forced to disclose very private matters, delays in admission
that often accompany the investigations following the discovery of a
mental health issue, and the likelihood that the inquiries may deter some
186
law students from obtaining counseling.
Although protecting the public is undoubtedly reason enough to
allow these inquires, scientific studies have demonstrated that "inquiries
about mental illness and addiction do not elicit meaningful knowledge
regarding competence."' 87 Moreover, medical research has revealed the
startling information that almost half the people treated by a mental
health professional do not actually suffer from a mental illness.' 88
Coupling this data with the fact that many people who do have a
recognizable psychiatric condition never consult a mental health
professional' 89 proves that, even if a correlation existed, the current
system of inquiry targets the wrong people (for example, people who are
dealing with their illness and being honest in revealing it) and fails to
justify the accompanying potential injury to the law student previously
discussed. Courts have thus far reached no consensus as to what, if any,

183. Jon Bauer, The Character of the Questions and the Fitness of the Process: Mental Health,
Bar Admissions and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 49 UCLA L. REV. 93, 95 (2001).
184. Id.
185. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000).

186. Bauer, supra note 183, at 96.
187. Phyllis Coleman & Ronald A. Shellow, Ask About Conduct, Not Mental Illness: A
Proposal for Bar Examiners and Medical Board to Comply with the ADA and Constitution, 20 J.
LEGIS. 147, 147 (1994).
188. See id. at 159.

189. See id.
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questions about mental illness or substance abuse licensing agencies
may pose to disabled candidates seeking admission to the Bar. 9 '
Although the character and fitness examination no longer
discriminates in such blatant ways as in the past, the modem system's
focus on a lawyer's fitness to practice, grounded in the scrutiny over
prior criminal records and current medical records, has resulted in an
over-inclusion of persons delayed or denied with a criminal record and
the potentially mentally impaired. This author does not see this as
changing with the ABA's 2008 adoption of Model Rules on Conditional
Admission of students with impairments, which would conditionally
grant admission to applicants who comply with the Lawyers Assistance
Program and other requirements during a probationary period.' 91
That is because it does not change the problems inherent in the
process of determining who gets admitted conditionally or
unconditionally.
V.

ON THE FRONT LINE: MORAL CHARACTER PAVING THE WAY FOR
EQUALITY AND SOCIAL ADVANCEMENT

Although indeterminacy sometimes manifests itself negatively, as
seen in the case of ex-felons and the disabled, admission procedures
have often led the way in promoting equality through blind admission
and an intentional focus on an applicant's fitness to practice. Indeed, in
focusing solely on fitness to practice, discrimination in specific terms of
race, religion, and political affiliation, which proved salient in the past,
is for the most part subordinate to more general inhibitive character
qualities that would prevent a lawyer from proper conduct. As a result,
discrimination solely on grounds of sexual orientation has failed to
permeate the Bar admissions process.
In recent decades, outside of Bar admissions, much has been done
to advance the civil rights of the gay and lesbian community. For
instance, the Local Law Enforcement Act ("LLEA") of 2005, more
popularly known as the Hate Crimes Bill, was introduced in the Senate
and was aimed at providing federal assistance to state and local
jurisdictions to prosecute hate crimes and branded violence motivated by

190. See Bauer, supra note 183, at 139-48 (discussing and contrasting court approaches to this
issue).
191. MODEL RULE ON CONDITIONAL ADMISSION TO PRACTICE LAW (Feb. 2008), available at
www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/colap/ABAModelRule-ConditionaAdmission-Feb2008.
pdf.
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a victim's "sexual orientation" as a hate crime.' 92 In May 2007, the
House voted to "extend hate-crime protection to those victimized
because of their sexuality."'' 93 In 2003, in Lawrence v. Texas, the
Supreme Court struck down the criminalization of homosexual sodomy
in Texas, holding that intimate consensual sexual conduct was part of
the liberty protected by substantive due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 194 This decision overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, decided in
1986, when the Supreme Court upheld the criminalization of adult
consensual private homosexual sodomy.' 95 Indeed, on the whole, the
civil rights and protections offered to the gay and lesbian community
have steadily increased in recent decades.
Regardless of one's personal opinion on the morality of the issue,
there is no denying that gays and lesbians, whether justly or not, are not
afforded the same rights as heterosexuals. For example, under the "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" policy of the Unites States Armed Services, "gay and
lesbian members of the armed forces have been discharged or denied reenlistment in cases where they have either engaged in homosexual
activity, or revealed themselves to be gay or lesbian."'' 96 Moreover, the
issue of "gay marriage" and equal rights afforded to gay couples through
197
civil unions as well as gay adoption stand as salient political issues.
Yet, in admissions to the Bar, sexual orientation rarely, if ever,
prevents an applicant from practicing law. Certainly, the subjectivity and
indeterminacy of the moral character requirement enables the emergence
of certain prejudices but not without a rational connection to one's
fitness to practice. As such, although homosexual applicants may
hypothetically be targeted and no specific measures have been placed to
protect them, there have yet to be any appeals or complaints in
admissions based on an applicant's sexual orientation:
That gay and lesbian aspirants to the practice of law presently have
little to fear from Bar examiners and character committees .... is a
conclusion powerfully fortified by the existence of organizations

192. S. 1145, 109th Cong. § 249(2) (2005). This bill, however, never actually became law. S.
1145 [109th]:
Local
Law
Enforcement
Act
of 2005,
http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bill.xpd?bill=s109-1145 (last visited Aug. 26, 2008).
193. David Stout, House Votes to Expand Hate-Crime Protection,N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2007, at
A19.
194. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
195. 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
196. Joel Jay Finer, Gay and Lesbian Applicants to the Bar: Even Lord Devlin Could Not
Defend Exclusion, Circa 2000, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 231, 242 (2000).

197. See Andrea Stone, Drives to Ban Gay Adoption Heat Up in 16 States, USA TODAY, Feb.
24, 2006, available at http://www.usatoday.comnews/nation/2006-02-20-gay-adoptionx.htm.
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among the judiciary, among attorneys in numerous jurisdictions, and
among law students throughout the country, dedicated to advancing the
legal rights of men and women whose fulfillment may best be attained
by intimate association with those of the same sex.198
The ABA, to its credit, has led the charge, adopting several
resolutions in favor of laws "forbidding discrimination on the basis of
sexual
orientation
in
employment,
housing,
and
public
accommodations,"1' 99 as well as laws "prohibiting the disadvantaging of
homosexuals with regard to adoption, child custody, and visitation
rights. 2 °0 Whereas certain sectors of government and private companies
lag behind in the establishing of equal rights, the ABA, in its admissions
process and outside of it, has steadfastly supported the gay and lesbian
community.
VI.

SOLUTIONS

TO THE

ADMISSIONS PROCESS: PROTECTING THE

PUBLIC, JUSTICE, AND FUTURE

LAWYERS

While it is true that great strides have been made in the admissions
process, it should not be that the current discipline system relies almost
completely upon "entry regulation to guarantee competence." 20 1 Most
state Bars simply do not have the funding to continually monitor lawyers
for competence and character issues. Since many problems that inhibit a
lawyer's fitness to practice indisputably arise from the demands of the
legal profession, more should be done to prevent these problems from
arising both before and after admission. According to Benjamin Hoom
Barton, focus should be placed more on regulation through education
and discipline than on subjective character screening in the admissions
20 2
process.
With the help of the ABA, law schools could stress the importance
of ethical and moral behavior as a lawyer in classes while the students
are in law school; indeed, moral character should not arise for the first
time after an applicant has already passed the Bar examination and
accepted a job offer. Unfortunately, this is a job for the Dean of

198.
199.

Finer, supra note 196, at 260 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 261 (citing Paul Marcotte, House Affirms Gay Rights: Resolution Provokes Floor
Fight, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1989, at 125).
200. Id. (citing Jeffery G. Gibson, Lesbian and Gay Prospective Adoptive Parents: The Legal
Battle, HuM. RTS., Spring 1999, at 7, 7).
201. See Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An Economic Analysis of
the Justificationsfor Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARiz. ST. L.J. 429, 486 (2001).

202. See id. at 485-86.
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Students, and that is a law school position that seldom carries the
political clout that could be necessary to get the professors to comply.
An easier solution could be for law schools to offer programs on
drug and alcohol abuse/awareness and other issues that arise in their
schools that implicate moral character, such as cheating. They could
inform law students in the first year of law school about the moral
character requirement and how moral character is determined, so that it
is not a surprise when they apply for admittance to the Bar. This would
allow students to actively think about what it means to be a professional
while in law school. It could also assist them in laying a foundation of
good moral character to present to their state committee if need be while
they have three to four years to do so. Leslie Schiff, a lawyer in
Louisiana and a past Louisiana Bar president, has started such a program
at many law schools in Louisiana.2 °3
The harder issue to remedy is the different state Bars' styles of
character examinations. This author asked lawyers who comprise the
Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers listserv what can be
done to improve this disparity. A lawyer on the listserv proposed that
reciprocal admission to the Bar needs to become a reality across the
United States. This means that if one Bar admits a lawyer, another Bar
will not challenge the applicant on moral character grounds, mitigating
any anti-competitive and protectionist impact by Bars in other
jurisdictions.
But reciprocal discipline will not solve the problems inherent in an
initial subjective determination. The ABA could help by standardizing
the concept of moral character through narrowing inquiries into what is
really relevant to the practice of law. In order to accomplish this, the
ABA would have to conduct a study of admissions cases (all of them,
even cases not available to the public); in particular who gets admitted
and who does not. Only the ABA could do a thorough study, as this
author learned by simply trying to get the names of Committee members
in her state. If the number of admitted applicants in a state was racially
and economically disproportionate to all those admitted into the legal
field, we would find out quickly if there is a flaw in that state's system
of looking at one's past as a determining factor of moral character and
fitness to practice. Combining that study with a scrutiny of how many
applicants with delayed admission actually go on to be disciplined
would also shed some light on the issues raised by the subjectivity

203. Leslie J. Schiff, http:,/www.lsba.org/2007InsideLSBA/pastpresidents.asp
Aug. 26, 2008).
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inherent in a moral character determination. A comprehensive study
such as this might pave the way for a more sympathetic view towards
applicants with problem histories as a result of merely situational
socioeconomic status and racial background, and provide more
uniformity of results. Uniformity is a problem; this author has been
asked more than once "What is an easy state to get admitted?"
In this author's state, records of discipline, even if there is no
published case, are available to anyone. However, unpublished
admissions cases are not available at all, and that is the overwhelming
majority of the cases. The ABA should pressure state Bars to publish
admissions cases, retaining the confidentiality of the applicants by
redacting their names, in order to allow analysis of what moral character
is and evaluation of their process, even if only to level the playing field.
Moreover, applicants should have full access to the identities of the
character committee members who will be determining their moral
character. The fact that this information is kept confidential only
perpetuates applicant anxiety and the perception of an equal playing
field. A mandate that character committees diversify as much as possible
to incorporate all types of lawyers, laypersons, and mental health experts
will eliminate potential prejudices and biases from coloring admissions
decisions. Indeed, if'the system is meant to protect the public, then
shouldn't the public have a say on the admittance of applicants as
opposed to a team of self-regulating lawyers?
Finally, bias and sensitivity training should be mandated for every
committee member determining character. As this author has learned
from attending many character interviews, some questions come off,
even if unintentionally, as being harsh and judgmental, making the
applicant fearful of responding. Add in to the mix that the applicant's
responses are tape-recorded, and you often end up with an applicant in
tears.
This author's experience with the California Moral Character
Subcommittee has been fairly extensive, and surprisingly positive. But
any subcommittee, even the California Bar's, should be open to some
scrutiny. It is through oversight by the courts and social pressure that the
admissions process has made its strides in the past. And it is through
more oversight that it will continue to evolve.
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